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I. Introduction: Can a School District Punish a Student for Speech
Created Neither on School Property nor with School Property?
In January 2011, Taylor Bell was upset after two female
classmates told him that they felt uncomfortable about
inappropriate actions and comments made to them by two coaches
at Itawamba Agricultural High School (I.A.H.S.). 1 Bell decided to
stand up for them by composing a rap, which he first posted on his
private Facebook page and later publicly on YouTube. 2 After word
of the rap spread, Bell was suspended and ultimately expelled from
I.A.H.S. for violating a district policy that forbade threats,
harassment, or intimidation of school employees. 3 Thus, the issue
is whether and when a school district may punish a student for
speech that is neither created on school property nor with school
property or at a school event, as is the case with Bell’s rap. 4
Because of accessibility to online media on campus, administrators
should have the power to proscribe speech, which foreseeably or
actually does “materially and substantially disrupt the work and
discipline of the school.” 5

1. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 2014)
(describing the facts leading up to Bell’s suspension).
2. Id. at 285−86.
3. Id. at 288.
4. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
214–16 (3d Cir. 2011) (ruling that there must be a sufficient nexus between the
school and the speech in question in order for the district to punish a student who
creates it).
5. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506
(1969) (explaining that students do not shed their First Amendment rights at the
schoolhouse gate).
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II. Background
A. First Amendment Law
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Congress
from making any law “abridging the freedom of speech.” 6 While
this right is broad, it is not absolute. 7 The Supreme Court has long
held that there are certain times and certain areas in which the
prevention and punishment of speech is permissible under the
Constitution. 8 These include “the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and . . . insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by
their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace.” 9 State bans on true threats are constitutional
as well. 10 A statement constitutes a true threat when the speaker
communicates intent to inflict unlawful physical violence upon
another person or group of people. 11 Because such speech contains
no social value and has the ability to cause substantial harm and
disruption to the person threatened, these prohibitions are lawful
regardless of whether the speaker actually intends to carry out the
threat. 12

6. U.S. CONST. amend I.
7. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) (discussing
some classes of speech which may be prevented and punished without raising a
constitutional issue).
8. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 344 (2003) (explaining that
prohibition of truly threatening language is lawful because of the detrimental
effect that it has on the recipient).
9. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571−72 (stating that there are certain
classes of speech that lack any social value and are not essential to any form of
expression, thus are not protected).
10. Black, 538 U.S. at 344.
11. Id.; see also Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (explaining
that, while some communication may contain threatening language, the threat
itself is not protected by the Constitution).
12. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (“A threat may
cause serious emotional distress for the person threatened and those who care
about that person, and a threat may lead to a violent confrontation.”).
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B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Student Speech

The Supreme Court long ago held that public school students
retain some rights at school, but the extent of these protections
remains unclear. 13 The few student speech cases that the Court has
heard comprise the foundation upon which the current analysis is
based. 14 In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District, the leading school speech case, several students sued the
Des Moines, Iowa school district after they were suspended for
wearing black armbands at school to protest the Vietnam War. 15
The Court held that students retain their free speech rights at
school and that this form of censorship, suppression of expression
of an individual’s beliefs, is void “without evidence that it is
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with
schoolwork or discipline.” 16
This burden is not met when the sole purpose for punishing
student expression is to prevent the unpleasantness that follows
an unpopular viewpoint. 17 Rather, the standard of review is that
the expression must actually, or be reasonably forecasted to,
disturb the school’s work. 18 The passive act of the students in
13. See W.Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)
(determining that constitutional protections remain in place at school because of
the important duty of educators to prepare America’s youth for citizenship, and
that a student cannot be compelled to salute the flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) (finding that the school district violated
the students’ free speech rights when it prohibited them from wearing black
armbands in protest of the Vietnam War); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (explaining that public schools are in the unique position of
educating students both educationally and socially, so they may censor
unacceptable social behavior); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,
266 (1988) (determining that “First Amendment rights of students in public
schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings . . . .”) (citing Bethel, 478 U.S. at 682); Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393,
410 (2007) (ruling that the First Amendment does not require schools to tolerate
student speech that advocates illegal drug use).
14. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 334 (1985) (finding that “school
officials act as representatives of the State, not merely as surrogates for
the parents of students, and they cannot claim the parents’ immunity from the
Fourth Amendment's strictures.”).
15. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 504.
16. Id. at 511.
17. See id. at 509 (citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
18. Id. at 508, 514.
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Tinker created no actual disturbance on campus, nor were there
any facts showing that administrators reasonably could have
forecast any disruption, so the First Amendment protected them. 19
This remains the benchmark for determining the constitutionality
of censoring student speech. 20
Despite Tinker’s seemingly bright-line rule, many questions
arose in its wake, and subsequent decisions have consistently
peeled back at its expansive reach. The Court now recognizes a
limited set of circumstances in which school officials may constrain
student speech even if it is “non-disruptive within the meaning of
Tinker.” 21 In Bethel School District No. 43 v. Fraser, the Court
upheld the school district’s decision to suspend a student for
delivering a sexually explicit speech at a school assembly. 22 Even
without any showing of substantial disruption, schools have
latitude to prohibit otherwise protected speech because of their
unique role of imparting upon the students the bounds of “socially
appropriate behavior.” 23 Therefore, they may suppress expression
that is “unrelated to any political viewpoint” and contains no merit,
as this furthers their interest in protecting children from offensive
conduct. 24 The reasoning for this is that “the constitutional rights
of students in public schools are not coextensive with the rights of
adults in other settings,” so speech which is protected in a public
forum can be prohibited in the school context. 25 There is also a
strong presumption in favor of school boards to determine exactly
what language they find is inappropriate. 26
19. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
20. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 2015).
21. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 293 (5th Cir. 2014).
22. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676 (1986) (“The
First Amendment did not prevent the School District from disciplining
respondent for giving the offensively lewd and indecent speech at the assembly.”).
23. See id. at 681 (finding that because public schools are in the unique
position of educating students both educationally and socially, they may censor
unacceptable social behavior).
24. See id. at 684−85 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871–72 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting)); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978)
(defending this exception to First Amendment freedoms).
25. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 395 (2007) (quoting Bethel, 478
U.S. at 682) (establishing another method for validly circumscribing student
expression in the school setting).
26. Bethel, 478 U.S. at 683.

208

23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 203 (2016)

Tinker was further eroded two years later in Hazelwood
School District v. Kuhlmeier. 27 In this case the principal cut two
articles from the student newspaper, produced as part of a
journalism class, prior to their publication. 28 One article concerned
the experiences of pregnant high school girls and the other
discussed the impact divorce has on high school students. 29 The
principal argued that the content of the articles might upset some
younger students. 30 He also felt it was unfair to publish the divorce
piece without allowing the parents a chance to respond. 31
As a threshold matter, the Hazelwood court first analyzed
whether the school newspaper was a “forum for public expression,”
and was thus entitled to constitutional protection. 32 A public forum
is created only when administrators open up school facilities,
either by policy or in practice, for “indiscriminate use by the
general public” or a portion of the public, like a student group. 33
Because school policy manuals described the newspaper as part of
the educational curriculum, the Court found that the newspaper
was not a public forum, but a “supervised learning experience for
journalism students.” 34 As such, the administration could place
reasonable restraints on speech contained within. 35
Hazelwood did not completely undo the Tinker framework, but
it established that the “substantial interference” standard does not
apply with the same rigor to school-sponsored educational
activities as it does to personal political beliefs held by members of
the student body. 36 A school cannot be forced to “lend its name and
27. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988) (holding
that “First Amendment rights of students in public schools are not automatically
coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings . . . .”).
28. Id. at 262.
29. Id. at 263.
30. Id. at 260.
31. Id.
32. See id. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983)).
33. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988).
34. See id. at 267 (relying on the definitions set out in the School Board Policy
Manual and the Hazelwood East Curriculum Guide).
35. Id.
36. See id. at 273 (“[W]e hold that educators do not offend the First
Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student
speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are
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resources to the dissemination of student expression.” 37 This is the
crucial difference between Hazelwood and Tinker, where the
students’ speech was completely unrelated to any school sponsored
activity.
Morse v. Frederick38 is the most recent Supreme Court decision
on student expression, and the first time that the Court upheld a
school’s decision to punish off-campus speech. 39 In January 2002,
the principal of Juneau-Douglas High School, Petitioner Morse,
suspended Respondent Frederick for displaying a banner which
read “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” across the street from the school, as
the Olympic Torch Relay passed through town. 40 As a schoolsanctioned activity, teachers and administrators were present to
monitor the students and enforce the district’s student conduct
rules. 41 Morse demanded that the students take down the banner
as soon as she saw it. 42 Frederick refused and was suspended for
violating the district policy forbidding promotion of illegal drug
use. 43 Frederick sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming a violation
of his First Amendment rights. 44
The Supreme Court agreed with Morse, holding that
administrators can limit otherwise protected speech when it occurs
on campus or at a school sponsored event, because of the “special
characteristics of the school environment.” 45 Consistent with this
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”).
37. Id. at 272–73.
38. 551 U.S. 393 (2007).
39. See generally id. (deciding that the principal did not violate the student’s
free speech rights for confiscating a banner which promoted illegal drug use).
40. Id.
41. See id. at 393, 398 (“Juneau School Board Policy No. 5850 subjects
‘[p]upils who participate in approved social events and class trips’ to the same
student conduct rules that apply during the regular school program.’”).
42. Id. at 398.
43. See id. (“Juneau School Board Policy No. 5520 states: ‘The Board
specifically prohibits any assembly or public expression that . . . advocates the use
of substances that are illegal to minors.’”).
44. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 399 (2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(allowing a cause of action for any person within the United States to seek relief
for “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws.”).
45. See Morse, 551 U.S. at 394–95 (2007) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)) (explaining that Congress has
stated that such a “special characteristic” is to deter students from using illegal
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principle, school officials may take actions to protect the students
in their care. 46 Because there is a compelling government interest
in combating illegal drug use, the Court held that Morse did not
violate Frederick’s rights when she suspended him. 47 This is a
significant decision for this line of cases because the school’s
actions were upheld under the compelling interest analysis. 48
Therefore, schools have another avenue to lawfully proscribe
student speech when they cannot prove that any substantial
disruption did, or foreseeably could, result. 49 More importantly,
this decision held that it is possible for the schoolhouse gate to
extend off-campus. 50
C. Lower Courts’ Regulation of Off-Campus Speech
The Morse decision acknowledged that the power of school
officials to punish certain student speech is not completely limited
by the physical boundaries of the campus. 51 Because it did not
enumerate how far this reach extends, lower courts have
considerable discretion to determine when conscription of offcampus student speech is valid.
Regulation of off-campus speech usually occurs when it makes
its way to school somehow. 52 The extent that the arm of authority
may reach beyond the schoolhouse gate has steadily expanded
since the Second Circuit’s decision in Thomas v. Board of
Education. 53 In Thomas, several students sued the board of
education after they were punished for creating and distributing a
drugs).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 407 (finding that schools can punish students for expression
that does not create a material or substantial disruption).
49. Id. at 408−09.
50. Scott L. Sternberg, Outside the Schoolhouse Gate: The Limits of Tinker
v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, COMMC’NS LAWYER (Sept.
2014), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/communications_lawyer/2014/
september14/tinker.html (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil
Rights and Social Justice).
51. Id.
52. Sternberg, supra note 50.
53. 607 F.2d 1043 (2d Cir. 1979).
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satirical newspaper off-campus. 54 The paper, Hard Times, included
articles regarding various members of the school community,
masturbation, and prostitution. 55 The school board claimed that
the paper was “morally offensive, indecent, and obscene” and
predicted that it would have a “‘devastating’ effect on public
education.” 56
The Second Circuit’s opinion stressed the importance of the
First Amendment, which protects all expression unless it is
“capable of perpetrating grievous harm.” 57 When speech occurs
outside of the schoolyard, the restrictions on the First Amendment
lose effect. 58 Therefore, because the students purposefully printed
and sold the paper off-campus, school officials had no authority to
regulate its content. 59 This decision upheld the holding in Tinker
that school boards do not have unfettered discretion to limit speech
purely because they find it disagreeable. 60
1. Regulation of Violent Speech
Discipline of speech that is not created or explicitly directed
toward campus is upheld by many courts when the speech contains
violent references. 61 The more specific references the threatening
language contains, such as time, manner, and people the violence
54. See id. at 1050 (finding that the fact that the students occasionally typed
articles and stored publication materials at school was insufficient evidence to
render the paper on-campus speech).
55. Id. at 1045.
56. Id. at 1046.
57. See id. at 1047 (“Embodied in our democracy is the firm conviction that
wisdom and justice are most likely to prevail in public decision-making if all ideas,
discoveries, and points of view are before the citizenry for its consideration”, citing
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
United States v. Associated Press, 52 F.Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand,
J.), aff’d, 326 U.S. 1 (1945)).
58. Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).
59. Id.
60. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509
(1969) (stating that proscription of speech is unlawful if done merely because of
the “desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany
an unpopular viewpoint,” citing Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir.
1966)).
61. See Sternberg, supra note 50 (giving examples of cases in which violent
speech was disciplined).
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is directed toward, the more seriously it will be taken. 62 In the
years since the Columbine, Virginia Tech, and Sandy Hook
shootings, and in light of the current reality of students
committing horrendously violent acts upon school communities,
these threats must be taken seriously. 63
In Doe v. Pulaski County Special School District64 a middle
school student, J.M., was expelled from school for writing a violent
letter to his ex-girlfriend, K.G. 65 The letter was made public by
another student, who had found it at the author’s house and
brought it to school without J.M.’s knowledge or consent. 66 J.M.’s
mother brought suit on his behalf, claiming that the school board
violated her son’s free speech rights when it disciplined J.M. for
the letter, which he had written at home and never intended K.G.
to receive. 67
The court’s analysis focused on whether a finder of fact should
consider the speaker’s or the recipient’s point of view to determine
whether speech constitutes a true threat and is void of First
Amendment protection. 68 The court found that the nature of the
alleged threat must be considered from the viewpoint of the
reasonable recipient. 69 The Eighth Circuit further concluded that
J.M. intentionally communicated a threat when he discussed the
contents of the letter with a friend and K.G. herself, before it made
its way to school. 70 The school board had authority to discipline this
off-campus speech because “when a threatening idea or thought is
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. 306 F.3d 616 (8th Cir. 2002).
65. See id. at 619 (“J.M. drafted two violent, misogynic, and obscenity-laden
rants expressing a desire to molest, rape, and murder K.G.”).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 620.
68. See id. at 622 (“The views among the courts diverge . . . Some ask
whether a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the speaker would foresee
that the recipient would perceive the statement as a threat, whereas others ask
how a reasonable person standing in the recipient’s shows would view the alleged
threat”) (comparing Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am.
Coalition of Live Activists, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc) with United
States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 49 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 968 (1994)).
69. Id. at 623.
70. Doe v. Pulaski Cty. Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 620, 625 (8th Cir.
2002).
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communicated . . . the government’s interest in alleviating the fear
of violence and disruption associated with the threat engages.” 71
By contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Porter v. Ascension Parish
School Board 72 ruled that there was no intentional communication
by the creator of a violent drawing that was accidentally brought
to school. In Porter, Andrew Porter accidentally brought a twoyear-old picture drawn by his brother, Adam, to class. 73 After
another student found the drawing, which depicted various violent
acts directed at the East Ascension High School building; school
authorities suspended both Adam and Andrew. 74
Because Adam never intended for the drawing to leave home,
much less to end up on campus, the Fifth Circuit did not consider
this a true school speech issue. 75 Rather their analysis rested on
whether the threatening or disruptive content was knowingly or
intentionally disseminated, which is required to remove First
Amendment protection from allegedly threatening speech. 76
Ultimately, the Court determined that something more than
accidental exposure in public is needed to prove a valid threat to
the school community. 77 True threats require intent. 78 Otherwise,
allowing such prohibition would impermissibly infringe free
speech rights. 79
In Ponce v. Soccorro Independent School District, 80 intentional
communication of a threat was not evaluated because student
71. Id. at 624.
72. 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004).
73. See id. at 611 (explaining that Andrew Porter brought a notepad
including a two-year-old sketch drawn by his older brother, Adam, to school).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 617 (“[W]e need not decide whether Adam’s drawing would
institute a true threat . . . because Adam did not intentionally or knowingly
communicate his drawing in a way sufficient to remove it from the protection of
the First Amendment.”).
76. Id. at 618.
77. Id.
78. See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608 (5th Cir. 2004)
(“Adams’s drawing cannot be considered a true threat as it was not intentionally
communicated.”).
79. Id.
80. 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding that speech which poses a unique
threat to the school environment has fewer protections than it would be afforded
otherwise).
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speech is not protected when it “poses a direct and demonstrable
threat of violence unique to the school environment.” 81 In that case,
the principal suspended a student after he discovered a diary, the
contents of which threatened a Columbine-style attack on the
school. 82 Generally, content-based restrictions on speech are
presumed unconstitutional, and they may only be employed when
that speech is likely to incite imminent lawless action. 83 However,
the majority opinion sided with the school district in this case,
because “some harms are in fact so great in the school setting that
requiring a school administrator to evaluate their disruptive
potential is unnecessary.” 84 This case narrowly extended Morse
and held that Tinker’s substantial disruption requirement is
inapplicable when speech that threatens mass murder of the school
population is brought to campus. 85
D. Lewd Speech Online
The necessary facts that must be proven to meet Tinker’s
substantial disruption, or foreseeability of substantial disruption,
standard have proven problematic for the circuit courts to apply
uniformly. This is made all the more difficult when considering the
“‘everywhere at once’ nature of the internet.” 86 A case from the
Fifth Circuit, Snyder v. Blue Mountain School District, and a case
from the Third Circuit, Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
School District, consider what, if any, power school authorities
have to curtail speech that is created by a student online, away
from school. 87
81. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 298 (5th Cir. 2014)
(citing Ponce v. Soccorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765, 766 (2007)).
82. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766 (describing the contents of the student’s
diary).
83. See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 437 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)).
84. See Ponce, 508 F.3d at 770 (relying on Justice Alito’s concurrence in
Morse that a substantial government interest in preventing violence at school
overrides the necessity of a Tinker style analysis).
85. Id. at 772.
86. J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d Cir.
2011) (Smith, J., concurring).
87. See id. at 915 (analyzing whether online speech off of school property can
be restricted). Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205
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In Snyder, the Blue Mountain School District suspended a
middle school student, J.S., for creating a derogatory and sexually
explicit profile on the social networking site MySpace that
impersonated her school’s principal, James McGonigle. 88 J.S. made
the profile at her home, on a weekend, and did not identify the
principal or school by name; though an official photograph taken
from the school district’s website did appear on the profile. 89 The
school’s server blocked MySpace, so no student had access to the
page on campus. 90 In fact, the only physical connection to the
campus was a printout of the profile that McGonigle requested a
student bring to him. 91 The school district did not argue that the
profile created a substantial disruption in school, or that any
substantial disruption was reasonably foreseeable as a result of its
creation. 92
The district court held J.S.’s suspension constitutional under
Fraser’s “vulgar and offensive” exception to the speech protections
enumerated in Tinker. 93 In Fraser, the Supreme Court held that
school officials can regulate lewd and plainly offensive speech in
school because of their duty to ‘“prepare pupils for citizenship in
the Republic’.” 94 Fraser was inapplicable here however, because
that exception applies only to speech that occurs “in school” or at
some approved social event, as in Morse. 95 The Court warned that
(3d Cir. 2011).
88. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 921.
91. Id.
92. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920,
922–23 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding that the only disruptions resulting from the profile
were “general ‘rumblings’” around school, one teacher quieting a group of students
in class who were discussing the site, and that one guidance counselor
rescheduled a few meetings).
93. Id. at 924.
94. See Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 43 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)
(discussing the importance of learning the boundaries of socially appropriate
behavior); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979) (reiterating that a
central purpose of public education is the “inculcat[ion of] fundamental values
necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system.”).
95. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 932 (“Specifically in Morse, Chief Justice
Roberts, writing for the majority, emphasized that ‘[h]ad Fraser delivered the
same speech in a public forum outside the school context, it would have been
protected,’” quoting Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007)).
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extending Fraser to allow the school to sanction J.S. for creating
the MySpace profile “would be to adopt a rule that allows school
officials to punish any speech by a student that takes place
anywhere, at any time, as long as it is about the school or a school
official, is brought to the attention of a school official, and is
deemed “offensive” 96 The precedent created by such a rule would
allow public schools to strip students of their First Amendment
rights for speaking in a manner that is neither directed at nor
disruptive to the school environment. 97
This case is also informative for its discussion of the boundless
nature of the Internet. Similar to the accidental dissemination of
physical content in Porter, the fluidity of the Internet leads courts
to focus on whether there is evidence of any intentional direction
of the speech towards the school. 98 If however, the speech makes
its way onto campus unintentionally, the creator has the same
equal protections as any adult in the community at large and is
subject to none of the school specific exceptions to freedom of
expression. 99 This was not an issue in Snyder, but in Taylor Bell’s
case the Fifth Circuit found that he had directed his rap to the
school community to such an extent that it transformed into oncampus speech. 100 The court reasoned that because Bell admitted
that he had created the song in order to increase awareness of the
allegations against the coaches, he had engaged in intentional
direction to the school. 101

96. Id. at 933.
97. See id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring) (stating that allowing interference
of wholly off-campus speech is not the law).
98. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011) (noting the importance of proof that the student intended their speech
to reach campus).
99. Id.
100. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015)
(reasoning that the rap was on-campus speech because a portion of Bell’s intended
audience were students and faculty at I.A.H.S.).
101. See id. at 396 (“[T]here is no genuine dispute of material fact that Bell
intended his rap recording to reach the school community. He admitted . . . that
one of the purposes for producing the record was to ‘increase awareness of the
[misconduct]’ and . . . he knew people were ‘gonna listen . . . .’”).
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E. A New Test for Online Speech: Sufficient Nexus
Similar to Snyder, in Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
School District 102 a student, Justin Layshock, created a parody
MySpace profile of school’s principal and was suspended following
a disciplinary hearing. 103 Layshock used a school computer to
access the site on two occasions; once to show the page to some
classmates, and a second time when he tried to delete the page. 104
Nevertheless, the school was unable to show that any widespread
disorder resulted from the profile, and justified their discipline on
the connection between the profile and the school. 105 Layshock
subsequently filed suit, alleging a violation of the First
Amendment because his expressive conduct “originated outside of
the schoolhouse, did not disturb the school environment and was
not related to any school sponsored event.” 106
In this case, as in Snyder, the school district could not defend
its actions under Tinker or its exceptions, because they were
unable to show that any material or substantial disruption
occurred. 107 Instead the school district argued that its actions were
justified because there was a sufficient nexus between the site and
the school. 108 According to this sufficient nexus test, suppression of
speech is acceptable if there is a credible link between the school
and the information published online by the student. 109 Here, the
district argued that Layshock entered school property when he
copied a picture of the principal from their website. 110 He
102. 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
103. Id. at 208.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 218–19.
106. See id. at 207 (concluding that the school went further than the law
allows in disciplining Layshock).
107. See id. at 214 (“[T]he School District is not arguing that it could properly
punish Justin under the Tinker exception for student speech that causes a
material and substantial disruption of the school environment.”).
108. See U.S.C.A. amend. I (showing that circuit courts need not always
adhere to the Tinker standard when evaluating student speech claims).
109. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
214 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that the school district relied on this test because
it could not prove a substantial disruption of the school environment caused by
the student’s speech).
110. Id.
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intentionally directed his speech at the school when he showed the
page to classmates. 111
This new analysis illustrates a move by some courts and school
districts to determine the precise limits of the schoolyard in light
of the fluid nature of the Internet. 112 The court rejected the school
district’s argument that Layshock “entered” the school by
accessing the district website. 113 Instead they relied on Thomas,
finding the punishment unacceptable because nearly all of the
communication was created off campus, with an inconsequential
portion conducted within the schoolhouse gate. 114 Though the
sufficient nexus test is a creative method for incorporating Internet
speech into the school speech analysis, the Third Circuit found that
it could create a “dangerous precedent to allow the state . . . to
reach into a child’s home and control his/her actions there to the
same extent it can control that child when he/she participates in
school sponsored activities.” 115 The court affirmed that schools
must prove a violation of Tinker or one of its exceptions to succeed
on such a claim. 116
III. The Fifth Circuit Sets New Precedent: Bell v. Itawamba
County School Board 117
Taylor Bell recorded his rap during Christmas vacation and,
upon returning to school, was questioned about it by school
111. See id. at 209 (“Justin used a computer in his Spanish classroom to access
his MySpace profile of Trosch. He also showed it to other classmates, although he
did not acknowledge his authorship.”).
112. Id. at 214.
113. See id. at 214−15 (“The School District’s attempt to forge a nexus
between the School and Justin’s profile by relying upon his ‘entering’ the District’s
website to ‘take’ the District’s photo of Trosch is unpersuasive at best.”).
114. Id. at 215 (citing Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1045 (2d Cir.
1979)).
115. Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 216
(3d Cir. 2011).
116. See id. at 219 (“We believe the cases relied upon by the School District
stand for nothing more than the rather unremarkable proposition that schools
may punish expressive conduct that occurs outside of school, as if it occurred
inside the “schoolhouse gate,” under certain very limited circumstances, none of
which are present here.”).
117. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 280 (5th Cir. 2014).
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authorities. 118 Bell testified that he never encouraged anyone at
school to listen to his song, nor did he ever play it at school. 119
However, one of the coaches listened to it on campus, using a
student’s cell phone. 120 After this questioning, Bell posted the video
to YouTube. 121 The following day, Bell was suspended for violating
a district rule prohibiting the use of threatening speech. 122 Though
school authorities claimed that Bell was suspended because the
principal believed that he was presently dangerous, he was
allowed to wait on campus, unsupervised, until he could ride the
bus home at the end of school day. 123 Additionally, at no point
during any of these proceedings were the police notified, nor Bell’s
locker searched. 124 The school district held a disciplinary hearing
to determine whether Bell had “threatened, intimidated, and/or
harassed one or more school teachers.” 125
During the hearing, Bell stated that he did not intend to
intimidate, threaten, or harass the coaches, but that the rap was
artistic expression, which he hoped would increase awareness of
the problem. 126 The school district did not claim that the rap
created, nor was foreseen to create, a substantial disruption at
school, but decided to uphold the suspension. 127 They reasoned that
118. See id. at 285 (“Let me tell you a little story about these Itawamba
coaches/ . . . . Now you just another pervert coach . . ./ I’m going to hit you with by
rueger Think you got some game/cuz your f****** with some juveniles/ . . . Rubbing
on black girls ears in the gym.”).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 286.
122. Id.
123. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 286 (5th Cir. 2014).
124. See Michael Render (aka “Killer Mike”) & Erik Nielson, Killer Mike: Free
speech - - unless
it’s
rap?,
CNN
(Feb.
18,
2016,
8:03
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/17/opinions/rap-first-amendment-supreme-court-rendernielson/ (noting that young, poor, minority rappers are often prosecuted for their
art and do not get the same respect as the numerous other artists that depict
violent acts without repercussion) (on file with the Washington and Lee Journal
of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
125. See Bell, 774 F.3d at 287 (citing the school board’s assertion that it would
take up the merits at a separate hearing as its reason for not accepting the
affidavits Bell presented from the female students which corroborated his story).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 288; see also Shanley v. Ne. Indep. Sch. Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 974
(5th Cir. 1972) (concluding that the Tinker standard can be found by showing
“demonstrable factors that would give rise to any reasonable forecast by the
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Bell’s rap did harass and intimidate the coaches, but found the
lyrics themselves too vague to make a determination whether they
were actually threatening. 128 The school board then affirmed the
Committee’s decision, while adding that Bell did in fact threaten
district employees. 129 The board provided no reasoning for this
finding. 130
Bell and his mother then brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi against the
Itawamba County school board, the superintendent, and the
I.A.H.S. principal, claiming a violation of Bell’s right to freedom of
speech under the First Amendment. 131 After the district court ruled
in favor of the school board, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit
reversed. 132 The panel held that the school board had infringed
Bell’s rights and that there was insufficient evidence to prove his
song “caused a substantial disruption of school work or discipline,
or that school officials reasonably could have forecasted such a
disruption.” 133
The school board appealed and the case was then heard by the
Fifth Circuit en banc. 134 The Court reversed the earlier decision
and found that schools may proscribe student conduct that
“materially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others.” 135 This rule “[applies] when a
student intentionally directs at the school community speech
reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and
intimidate a teacher, even when the speech originated, and was

school administration of ‘substantial and material’ disruption.”).
128. See Bell, 774 F.3d at 288 (“The School District’s ‘DisciplineAdministrative Policy’ prohibits ‘[h]arassment, intimidation, or threatening other
students and/or teachers.’”).
129. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 288−89 (5th Cir. 2014).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 282 (describing the procedural posture of the case); see also
U.S. CONST. amend. I (protecting freedom of speech); U.S. CONST. amend XIV
(protecting substantive due-process rights).
132. Bell, 774 F.3d at 282.
133. See id. (establishing that Bell’s acts did not meet the Tinker test, which
courts must use to determine whether student speech may be lawfully censored).
134. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 379 (5th Cir. 2015)
(rehearing Bell’s case).
135. Id. at 390.
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disseminated, off campus.” 136 In so ruling, the Court effectively
created a new rule, extending the parameters of school
administrators’ authority to restrict student speech. 137 In the Fifth
Circuit, Tinker now applies with equal force to off-campus
speech. 138
A. The Fifth Circuit’s Reasoning
Several judges, and many legal pundits, are wary of the
danger of the precedent that this decision creates. The principal
dissent, authored by Judge Dennis, laments the majority opinion
for failing to give a sufficient reason for applying the “material and
substantial disruption” analysis to this situation, because this had
previously been held not to apply off-campus. 139 He argues that
Hazelwood, Fraser, and Morse provide the only exceptions to
Tinker, and that school officials do not have “broad authority to
invoke the ‘special characteristics of the school environment’ in
order to circumvent their burden of satisfying the Tinker test.” 140
Writing for the majority in the panel decision, Judge Dennis
argued that the school board provided no evidence to establish that
a substantial disruption occurred or reasonably could have been
forecasted based on the facts presented. 141 He specifically
disapproved of the majority’s refusal to analyze the substance of
Bell’s rap, noting that it could be protected as a matter of public
concern, one of the key First Amendment values. 142 He argued
“Tinker does not authorize school officials to regulate speech that
occurs off campus and not at a school-sponsored event, where the
136. See id. at 396 (establishing a new rule for determining when schools can
sanction students for speech that reaches campus).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
140. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 774 F.3d 280, 293 (5th Cir. 2014)
(arguing that Supreme Court jurisprudence only allows for proscription of student
speech in limited circumstances).
141. Id. at 295.
142. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 404 (5th Cir. 2015)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that freedom of speech “occupies the highest
rung of hierarchy of First Amendment values,” citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S.
443, 452 (2011)).
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potential ‘collision’ of interest upon which Tinker’s holding pivots
simply is not present.” 143 Accordingly, Judge Dennis found that the
decision was based on inapplicable precedent that now allows
schools more authority to restrain students than any other circuit
or state Supreme Court. 144
IV. Elonis v. United States and Intentional Threats Online
While the Supreme Court has not addressed an online, offcampus student speech case, it recently heard Elonis v. United
States, 145 an online threat case. 146 The issue in Elonis was whether
conviction for communication of a threat requires proof of
subjective intent by the speaker or objective intent understood by
the reasonable person interpreting the statement. 147 Elonis was
convicted under a federal criminal threat statute 148 for making
threats on his Facebook page to injure his wife, an FBI agent, a
kindergarten class, police officers, and employees and patrons of a
park. 149 Though this is a criminal case, it is important to the Bell
decision because the Supreme Court held for the first time that
there is a mental state requirement to true threat convictions. 150
Elonis argued that according to Virginia v. Black 151 his speech
could not be a true threat because he lacked subjective intent to
143. See id. at 424 (disagreeing with the basis on which the majority placed
its decision).
144. See id. at 433 (stating that the majority’s opinion undermines freedom of
speech protections for all students).
145. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
146. See id. at 2013 (finding that a negligence standard alone is insufficient
to convict someone under a criminal threat statute).
147. See id. at 2023−24 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing how a reasonable
jury uses an objective analysis).
148. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (providing in part that any individual who
“transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing any
threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another” faces a
felony charge of up to five years imprisonment).
149. Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2007.
150. See id. at 2012 (discussing the purpose and knowledge components of the
mental state requirement).
151. 538 U.S. 343, 347−48 (2003) (concluding that there must be subjective
intent to threaten by a speaker and that the act of cross burning alone cannot be
prima facie evidence of intent to intimidate).
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threaten. 152 Relying on the principle that “wrongdoing must be
conscious to be criminal,” the Court agreed with Elonis that
negligence alone is insufficient, and the government bears the
burden to prove the defendant had a guilty mind. 153 However,
because it failed to determine what level of intent is required,
purpose or knowledge or simply recklessness, the Court did not
provide complete clarity on the issue. 154 It determined that
interpretation of the speech by the reasonable person is
immaterial, because the speaker must transmit “communication
for the purpose of issuing a threat or with knowledge that the
communication will be viewed as a threat.” 155 Therefore, “what
[Elonis] thinks does matter.” 156
The objective approach, which the government here argued
and the Third Circuit agreed with in the prior decision, finds that
it does not matter what the defendant thinks. 157 Rather, it should
only be relevant that the defendant knew the content and context
of his or her speech and that a reasonable person would interpret
the language as a genuine threat. 158 Justice Alito, writing
separately from the majority opinion, agreed, arguing that the
First Amendment should not protect speakers who claim that their
words were meant only for therapeutic effect, as Elonis did. 159 He
found this logic irrelevant because “whether or not the person
making a threat intends to cause harm, the damage is the same.” 160
152. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2016 (2015) (Alito, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (arguing that a threat made for the
therapeutic or cathartic benefit of the speaker is not protected by the First
Amendment).
153. See id. at 2009 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250
(1952)).
154. See Marie-Helen Maras, Unprotected Speech Communicated Via Social
Media: What Amounts to a True Threat?, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3–9 (2015) (asking
whether recklessness or some other standard must be shown).
155. See Elonis v United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015).
156. Id. at 2011.
157. See id. at 2007 (arguing that there need not be a requirement that the
speaker intends to threaten, but that the statement should be judged by how the
reasonable person would interpret it).
158. See id. at 2011 (discussing the mental state requirement involving a
communicated threat).
159. See id. at 2016 (Alito, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part) (arguing
that threatening speech should not be protected because it lacks any social value).
160. Id.
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While Bell and Elonis’s raps both contained violent messages
and vulgar imagery, the court in each case refrained from
addressing the First Amendment question, whether such online
speech constituted a true threat. 161 The Fifth Circuit panel did take
up the issue, holding that Bell’s rap was not a true threat because
it was not focused directly at the coaches, but was broadcast on
public Internet sites. 162 The panel majority noted the significant
difference between allegedly threatening speech communicated
privately, thus aimed only at its target, and publicly, whose
purpose is to “move public opinion and to encourage those of like
mind.” 163
Judge Dennis noted that context is paramount when
determining if an expression is actually threatening. 164 He also
found fault with the majority’s refusal to apply Supreme Court
precedents, such as that just upheld in Elonis, requiring proof of
more than negligence before upholding disciplinary action for
“threatening” speech. 165 Furthermore, he suggested that music is
metaphor, and as such, is not meant, nor should be taken,
literally. 166
Though Elonis has made no such claim, Bell argued that his
song is artistic expression and should be understood as that and
nothing more. 167 While this argument may seem like a convenient
escape for anyone accused of threating another person, the publicprivate distinction of the manner of the communication and the

161. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 400 (5th Cir. 2015)
(claiming it was unnecessary to address true threats because the case was decided
under Tinker).
162. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd, 774 F.3d 280, 301–02 (5th Cir. 2014)
(noting that the prevalence of violent rhetorical imagery in music is interpreted
by the public as metaphor and not sincerely).
163. See id. at 302 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette,
Inc., 290 F.3d 1058, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)).
164. See id. at 301–02 (citing Andrea L. Dennis, Poetic (In)Justice? Rap Music
Lyrics as Art, Life, and Criminal Evidence, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 1, 22 (2007)).
165. See Bell, 799 F.3d. at 404–05 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (listing and
describing the majority’s vague and fundamental errors).
166. See id. (suggesting that the song was an artistic expression and not a
legitimate threat).
167. See Bell, 774 F.3d at 287 (stating that this song aimed to express reallife experiences and was not meant to threaten or intimidate others).
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context of the dissemination can provide a reliable check on such
spurious claims. 168
V. Analysis
The mission of the primary and secondary public education
system in this country is to educate students, both academically
and in proper social and cultural norms. 169 This balance is
necessary for educators to maintain order so that they may create
an efficient and effective learning environment. 170 Public schools
are given significant discretion to constrain expression where it
poses a risk to the success of other students at the school. 171
Outside of school, the issue becomes murkier. Since 1969, courts
have agreed that public school officials lack authority to proscribe
student speech that is created and disseminated off campus. 172
The Internet and its boundless nature have created a new
dimension to the student speech discussion. While Bell and the
dissenting judges in the case argue that content created away from
school and disseminated online cannot be analogous to pure oncampus speech, Judge Jordan’s concurrence in Layshock notes:
For better or worse, wireless internet access, smart phones,
tablet computers, social networking services like Facebook, and
stream-of-conscious communications via Twitter give an
omnipresence to speech that makes any effort to trace First
Amendment boundaries along the physical boundaries of a
school campus a recipe for serious problems in our public
schools. 173

168. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd, 774 F.3d 280, 302 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[C]ontextual cues are vital in assessing whether a reasonable listener would
consider a statement a serious expression of an intent to cause harm . . . .”).
169. See Sternberg, supra note 50, at 20–26 (finding that these two aims
conflict with free speech protections).
170. Id. at 20.
171. Id. at 20–21.
172. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(1969) (discussing how the Constitution limits school officials ability to restrict
freedom of speech expressions occurring outside of the classroom).
173. See Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage School Dist., 650 F.3d 205,
220–21 (3d Cir. 2011) (Jordan, J., concurring) (noting that Tinker remains the
applicable standard for analyzing off-campus student speech).
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Bell argues that the Fifth Circuit went too far in upholding the
school district’s decision to reprimand him, and that there is now
a split amongst the Circuit Courts of Appeal regarding whether
school authorities may proscribe off-campus Internet speech. 174 He
claims that the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh
circuits, which all hold that Tinker applies to off-campus Internet
speech, are purportedly at odds with the Third Circuit. 175 Bell’s
argument is that the Third Circuit’s decisions in Layshock176 and
Snyder 177 are inconsistent with the holdings of the other circuits,
which have heard the issue. 178 In these two cases, the court found
that they did not have sufficient evidence of a substantial
disruption to reasonably uphold punishment of students for their
Internet speech. 179
The school board argues, however, that the decisions of the
Third Circuit in these two cases actually create no circuit split.
They find that the court did not categorically hold Tinker
inapplicable to off-campus Internet speech, only that it was not
applicable for disciplining the students in those specific situations.
In Layshock, the school district found that the student’s actions did
not create any substantial disruption at school, therefore

174. See Brief in Opposition, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379,
400 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666), 2016 WL 245421, at *13–18 (noting that Bell
argues that the Supreme Court should hear the case because the Third Circuit
has twice decided that the Tinker standard does not allow punishment for offcampus Internet speech, which is inconsistent with six other circuits).
175. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 393−94 (describing the precedent across each circuit
which has heard the issue; all of which agree that the Tinker standard applies to
certain off-campus situations).
176. See Layshock, 650 F.3d at 220 (applying Fraser’s vulgar and offensive
standard rather than Tinker’s substantial disruption standard to uphold the
school district’s decision to suspend a student for a parody MySpace profile
created away from school).
177. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir.
2011) (finding that Tinker applied to the student’s speech, but that the expression
did not rise to the level of a substantial disruption, nor a reasonable forecast of
substantial disruption).
178. See Brief in Opposition, Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379,
400 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666), 2016 WL 245421, at *13–15 (arguing that the
Third Circuit has rejected the Tinker standard as applied to off-campus speech
because it found Tinker inapplicable to the facts in Layshock and that there was
no reasonable forecast of substantial disruption in Snyder).
179. Id.
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defending its actions under the vulgar and offensive standard of
Fraser.
In both Thomas and Porter, decided by the Second and Fifth
Circuits respectively, Tinker was not applied to off-campus speech,
because “[d]oing so would empower schools to regulate students’
expressive activity no matter where it takes place, when it occurs,
or what subject matter it involves—so long as it causes a
substantial disruption at school.” 180 Ascertaining the student’s
purpose in creating and distributing the speech is paramount
when determining whether or not it is properly classified as on or
off-campus. 181 In Porter, the speaker did not intend to direct his
drawing to the school community, so Tinker was inapplicable and
the school could not punish Porter without violating his
constitutional rights. 182 In Bell, the same court justified applying
Tinker the analysis to the rap because the school board showed
sufficient evidence that Bell wanted the members of the school
community to hear his rap. 183
A. Public Policy Argument
The Fifth Circuit is not alone in finding instances where the
use of Tinker in a wholly off-campus issue is acceptable. 184
However, there is a difference in the rationale of previous cases
and that of the court in the case at bar. Unlike the parody profiles

180. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 939 (Smith, J., concurring) (warning of the
danger that will result from extending Tinker further than current Supreme
Court precedent).
181. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 394 (5th Cir. 2015)
(noting that Tinker applies to off-campus speech where it is intentionally directed
toward the campus).
182. See Porter v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 616 (5th Cir. 2004)
(threatening speech requires intentional or knowing communication by the
speaker towards a specific person or a third party).
183. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 385 (“[A]cknowledging several times during the
hearing that he posted the recording to Facebook because he knew it would be
viewed and heard by students.”).
184. See id. at 394 (citing Wynar v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 728 F.3d 1062,
1069 (9th Cir. 2013); D.J.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Hannibal Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 60, 647
F. 3d 754, 766−67 (8th Cir. 2011); Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Schs., 652 F.3d 565,
573−74 (4th Cir. 2011); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 48−50 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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created in Layshock or Snyder, which clearly had no basis in fact, 185
Taylor Bell wrote his rap in order to bring attention to a public
policy issue. 186 Neither the school board nor the court addressed
whether this speech is protected as a matter of public concern. 187
Bell stated several times that he created the rap because he
wanted the administration to investigate the allegations against
the coaches. 188 Despite four sworn affidavits by four of Bell’s
classmates, stating that they had in fact experienced sexual
harassment by the coaches, there was never any investigation into
the merits of the accusations. 189 Judge Dennis, in his dissent,
argues that Bell’s expression is protected precisely because of its
social purpose. 190
In an amicus curiae brief submitted to the United States
Supreme Court by rapper Killer Mike, along with several other
legal scholars and artists, the authors defended Bell’s rap as a form
of artistic expression. 191 They contend that Bell, an African
American, was discriminated against by the court and by his school

185. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 930 (3d
Cir. 2011) (finding no reasonable forecast of substantial disruption because the
profile was too outrageous to be believed).
186. See Kimberly Robinson, School Can Punish Off-Campus Rap, UNITED
STATES
LAW
WEEK
(BNA)
(Aug.
25,
2015),
https://www.bloom
berglaw.com/search/results/7ec2d338734dc9e657ec2f648a3398ac/document/X1M
GFEM8000000?jcsearch=dk%253Abna%2520a0h1v3d1t9#jcite
(noting
the
‘special protection’ afforded by the First Amendment to matters of public concern)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
187. See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 404 (5th Cir. 2015)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the majority’s ruling because the First
Amendment protects issues of public concern, no matter if the language used is
offensive); see also Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011) (stating that a
matter of public concern “occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First
Amendment values.”).
188. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 385 (explaining Bell’s defense of the rap).
189. Id. at 406; see also Liptak, Hip-Hop Stars Support Mississippi Rapper in
First Amendment Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2015) (questioning why these serious
questions of sexual assault were never given any credence).
190. Bell, 799 F.3d at 404 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (“Bell’s rap song constitutes
speech on ‘a matter of public concern’ and therefore ‘occupies the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values’”) (quoting Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452).
191. See Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, Bell v. Itawamba Cty.
Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315591, at *5–*6
(defending Bell’s rap as artistic expression that should not be taken literally).
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for expressing himself through the intentionally graphic rap
subgenre “gangsta” rap. 192
Anyone who is learned in law . . . is capable of separating art
and lyrics, whether you agree with them or not, and actual
human behavior. I think the courts understand it when it’s
Johnny Cash. I think they understand it when it’s Robert Nesta
Marley . . . [t]reating rap lyrics differently . . . persecutes poor
young men based on their class and color. 193

Accepting the violent imagery of other musicians, authors, and
poets as fiction, while refusing to do the same for rap music, which
the brief writers argue the court and school board did in their
decisions, “perpetuates enduring stereotypes about the inherent
criminality of young men of color.” 194
Bell intended for his rap to effect change at I.A.W.S., not for
the lyrics to be accepted as literal truth. 195 The brief argues
however, that because rappers are often young minority men who
strike a combative pose against authority figures, the school board
and the Fifth Circuit allowed their inherent biases to cloud their
acceptance of the rap as hyperbolic art. 196 Bell made no true threat,
nor violated district policy, which would allow the authorities to
reach outside of the school and reprimand him for violating
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard. 197 Because of this, Bell’s
First Amendment right to free expression was infringed and he
was unlawfully expelled from school. 198
192. See id. (asserting Bell’s defenses).
193. See Liptak, supra note 189, at 189 (questioning why school and court
officials are unwilling to view rap music as hyperbole and not the sincere desire
by the artist to carry out the acts they sing about).
194. See Amici Curiae Brief in Support of Petitioner, Bell v. Itawamba Cty.
Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-666), 2015 WL 9315591, at *6
(“Studies establish that many people also harbor negative stereotypes about rap
music that they do not have about other musical genres.”).
195. Id. at *14. The course language, explicit themes, and violent rhetoric
sometimes found . . . is also apparent in ‘the dozens,’ verbal competitions in which
two opponents trade insults—often in rhyme—until a winner emerges. Taken
literally, the barbs traded in the dozens may sound like threats or incitements to
violence. But as with African American word games generally, linguistic
virtuosity is prized above all else, and the winner is the person able to overpower
an opponent intellectually rather than physically. Id.
196. Id. at *11−12.
197. Id. at *24.
198. Id. at *32.
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23 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 203 (2016)
B. Tinker Analysis Applied to Bell v. Itawamba County
School Board

The Tinker standard applies to off-campus conduct when “a
student intentionally directs at the school community speech
reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and
intimidate a teacher.” 199 The issue before the Bell court was
whether such an understanding can constitute a reasonable
forecast of substantial disruption. 200 Though the court may be
correct in its determination that Bell was lawfully punished for his
rap, this rule gives schools more discretion than in any other
circuit that has heard the issue. 201 Now, a public school can
regulate off-campus speech by showing only that some third party
interpreted it as a threat, harassment, or intimidation. This
increased power is arguably the result of the language used, which
came from the district’s disciplinary manual: 202
[S]peech intentionally directed towards a school is properly
considered on-campus speech. On the other hand, speech
originating off campus does not mutate into on-campus speech
simply because it foreseeably makes its way onto campus. . . . A
bare foreseeability standard could be stretched too far, and
would risk ensnaring any off-campus expression that happened
to discuss school-related matters. 203

This is what happened in the Bell decision. The facts show that
the video never created any substantial disruption at school and
that one of the coaches mentioned was the only person to view it at
school. 204 However, Bell’s rap, which discussed school-related
199. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 396 (5th Cir. 2015).
200. Id. at 383.
201. See id. at 395 (listing the requirements in the Second, Fourth, Eighth,
and Ninth circuits for applying Tinker).
202. See id. at 406 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (finding fault with the majority for
transforming the disciplinary policy “into an unprecedented rule of constitutional
law that effectively permits school officials across our circuit to punish a student’s
protest of teacher misconduct regardless of when or where the speech
occurs. . . .”).
203. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 940 (3d
Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., concurring) (citing Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage
Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 205 (3d Cir. 2011); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student
Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1093 (2008)).
204. See Bell, 799 F.3d at 385 (noting that the coach admitted he did not feel
threatened by the rap).
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matters, was classified as on-campus, thus within the scope of
I.A.H.S. disciplinary action. 205
The Tinker decision itself specified that forecast of a substantial
disruption cannot be based merely on an “undifferentiated fear or
apprehension of disturbance” in order for school authorities to validly
proscribe student speech.206 There, the black armbands were
symbolic of an emotionally charged subject of the era: displeasure
over U.S. intervention in Vietnam. 207 The war dominated the news
and political discourse, but still the Supreme Court found that this
kind of charged political expression created no foreseeable disruption
at school. 208 The Third Circuit noted in Snyder that the Tinker ruling
created a high bar for schools to meet in order to validly claim a
foreseeable substantial disruption, one than cannot be overcome
because the school disagrees with the content. 209 Because of this,
courts must staunchly require evidence that the school
administration fears were legitimate and cannot simply punish a
student because it disagrees with his message or find it offensive or
distasteful. 210
VI. Conclusion
Student speech protection has never been absolute, and though
Taylor Bell did not create nor access his rap on campus, the majority
arrived at the correct conclusion. School authorities have a duty to
create a safe learning environment, so they cannot condone speech
that contains threatening language specifically directed at members
of their community. In February 2016, the Supreme Court denied
Bell’s petition for certiorari, so the decision of the Fifth Circuit stands.
205. Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 387 (5th Cir. 2015).
206. See Snyder, 650 F.3d at 930 (noting that school districts have a
significant burden to meet to successfully claim some student speech was
foreseeable to create a substantial disruption) (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 503 (1969)).
207. Id. at 929.
208. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969).
209. See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d
Cir. 2011) (arguing that creating a MySpace profile making fun of the school’s
principal is less inflammatory than the students’ armbands in Tinker, so should
also not be considered substantially disruptive).
210. Id. at 942.

